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The Pace of Change: Non-practicing Entities
and the Shifting Legal Landscape
By Robin Feldman*
In ordinary circumstances, legal doctrines evolve at a glacial
pace. As I have discussed in prior work, law is constantly driven
to adapt to changing circumstances within existing frameworks,
as tested and refined through various spheres of acceptance. 1
This is not, however, a speedy process, and it can take years or
even decades for issues on the ground to bubble up to the level of
an administrative agency, let alone the Supreme Court or
Congress.
Patent law is somewhat of an exception. 2 The compressed
time frame of twenty years—after which the patent expires—
encourages patent holders to identify and move quickly on issues
related to the boundaries of those rights. In addition, the pace of
science itself is rapid, which means that patents are constantly
interpreted and applied in an environment of rapidly changing
meaning and context. These factors can drive patent law to
evolve more rapidly than many areas of law.
Nevertheless, even for the field of patent law, the pace of
change in recent years has been astounding. One can see this on
numerous levels—from public awareness, to scholarship, to court
decisions, to legislative and regulatory decisions at the state and
federal level. Much of this focus is attributable to non-practicing
entities. Known by various names, including “monetizers,”
“patent assertion entities,” “NPEs,” and the more colorful
appellation of “patent trolls,” non-practicing entities have
exploded onto the scene in the last five to seven years, altering
business models across numerous sectors.
This piece will explore the impact that non-practicing
entities are having on the business and legal landscape in this
* Harry & Lillian Hastings Professor of Law and Director of the Institute for
Innovation Law, University of California Hastings College of the Law. I am grateful to
Dean Tom Campbell for his kind invitation to participate in this symposium and to Hadas
Livnat, UC Hastings public service librarian, for her research assistance.
1 ROBIN FELDMAN, THE ROLE OF SCIENCE IN LAW 94 (2009) (describing the
mismatch of law and science).
2 See ROBIN FELDMAN, RETHINKING PATENT LAW 27–29 (2012) (comparing patent
law to other legal regimes).
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country. The first part of the piece will explore what we know
about non-practicing entities, and what we do not know. The
second part will describe recent shifts in common law doctrines,
as well as regulatory and legislative actions. The last part will
consider the road ahead.
I. NON-PRACTICING ENTITIES
A considerable amount of ink has been spilled on how one
should define a non-practicing entity (“NPE”). With much money
at stake, numerous entities have an incentive to craft the
definition in a way that omits their own business model, a
process that has resulted in intense lobbying not only of
governmental officials, but also of academics. Throughout my
work, I try to use an uncomplicated definition: non-practicing
entities are those whose core business activity involves licensing
and litigating patents, rather than making products. This
definition includes everyone with that business model, regardless
of whether they are organized as a partnership, a trust, or in any
other manner.3
Monetization activity and non-practicing entities have
existed in the patent world across time. In recent years, however,
new types of business entities have emerged that are far more
sophisticated and extensive than what has been seen in the past.
For example, in a little over five years, the largest non-practicing
entity accumulated between 30,000 and 60,000 patent assets,
giving it the fifth largest patent portfolio of any domestic
U.S. company and the fifteenth largest of any company in the
world.4
Whether by accident or by design, the business model of
non-practicing entities has the potential to be quite lucrative,
regardless of the merit of any underlying patent claims. Taking a
simple patent lawsuit to trial costs between $1 million and
$6 million.5 Faced with such costs, a rational product company
3 For an extensive discussion of the different definitions used and the implications
of each, see Robin Feldman, Patent Demands & Startup Companies: The View from the
Venture Capital Community, 16 YALE J.L. & TECH. 236 (2014). Data for the study came
from the Lex Machina database, which extracts information from public databases
including the U.S. District Court websites and the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office
website. The Lex Machina database is available to academics free of charge. In addition,
in deciding whether a plaintiff was an operating company or a non-practicing entity, the
study used only publicly available data.
4 Tom Ewing & Robin Feldman, The Giants Among Us, 2012 STAN. TECH. L.
REV. 1, ¶ 1.
5 Colleen V. Chien, Of Trolls, Davids, Goliaths, and Kings: Narratives and Evidence
in the Litigation of High-Tech Patents, 87 N.C. L. REV. 1571, 1584 (2009); AM.
INTELLECTUAL PROP. LAW ASS’N, 2011 REPORT OF THE ECONOMIC SURVEY (2011). For
smaller cases where the amount in controversy is under $1 million, the average trial itself
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may choose to buy a license, regardless of whether the patent is
valid or in any way infringed by a company’s products. The
problem is magnified for non-practicing entities with large
portfolios. If a non-practicing entity asserts a large number of
patents, the cost of investigating the validity of the claims may
be greater than the cost of simply taking a license.
When a company that makes a product asserts its patents
against another product company, the targeted company can
threaten to retaliate by asserting its own patents against the
first company’s products. This mutually assured destruction can
act as a brake on the behavior of product companies.
Non-practicing entities, however, do not make any products and
thus are not vulnerable to the disciplining effect. In addition,
non-practicing entities are frequently structured as shell
companies, in which money is distributed to other entities. Thus,
even if a targeted company were to receive a judgment for
attorney’s fees or sham litigation damages—an unlikely event
under current law—the non-practicing entity could have no
available assets to pay the judgment. This business model
creates pressure for product companies to buy a license,
irrespective of the merits of the claim.
The impact of non-practicing entities, and the pace at which
those entities have come to dominate the patent landscape, can
be seen in recent studies of patent litigation. The following
information comes from an extensive academic study examining
all 13,000 patent lawsuits filed over four recent years.6 In 2007,
non-practicing entities filed only 25% of the patent lawsuits. That
percentage rose sharply in 2008, and by 2012, non-practicing
entities were filing a majority of the patent lawsuits in the
United States.7 In addition, of the top ten most frequent filers of
patent litigation, all ten were non-practicing entities.8
The impact of NPEs on patent litigation can be seen in terms
of defendants sued, as well as cases filed. The number of
defendants sued actually drops after passage of the America
Invents Act, but those numbers are still far above where we were
in 2007.9

costs almost a million dollars. Chien, supra, at 1592–93. For larger cases where the
amount in controversy is greater than $25 million, the average trial costs almost $6
million. Id. at 1584.
6 See Robin Feldman, Tom Ewing & Sara Jeruss, The AIA 500 Expanded: The
Effects of Patent Monetization Entities, UCLA J.L. & TECH., Fall 2013, at 1, 6.
7 Id. at 7.
8 Id. at 58.
9 Id. at 43–57.

Do Not Delete

638

5/22/2015 6:40 PM

Chapman Law Review

[Vol. 18:3

In particular, the America Invents Act, which became law in
September of 2011, changed patent lawsuit rules known as
joinder rules. The changes were intended to make it more
difficult to include many defendants in the same lawsuit. As a
result, if you want to sue a number of defendants after passage of
the America Invents Act, you have to file more lawsuits. For
academics looking at the data, it means one cannot simply count
lawsuits. A rise in lawsuits could simply mean that people are
engaging in the same amount of activity—they are just suing the
same number of people spread out across more lawsuits. Thus,
one must also look at the number of defendants sued. Looking at
the number of defendants sued confirmed a substantial increase
in litigation activity across the six-year period from the earliest
year of the study to the latest year.10
Although the number of defendants sued rises substantially
across time, the number of defendants sued by non-practicing
entities decreased from 2011 to 2012. To consider this further,
the study looked month-by-month, and the results were
fascinating. There was a huge spike in the total number of
defendants sued by non-practicing entities in the month before
the America Invents Act was signed into law.11 In other words,
non-practicing entities rushed to the courthouse to get their
lawsuits filed the month before the act was signed. In fact, the
increase was so high that we had to adjust the scale on the slide
just to get the picture onto a single image. Product companies
also increased the number of defendants sued that month by a
slight amount, but nothing compared to the sky-high levels at
which non-practicing entities increased their litigation activity.12
The number of defendants sued by non-practicing entities
the month after passage of the America Invents Act returned to
where it had been before the spike, until about six months later,
when the number of defendants sued began to rise again.
Anecdotal evidence suggests that non-practicing entities were
able to find a workaround to avoid the changes in the America
Invents Act. The critical point, however, is the following: despite
the reduction in defendants sued after passage of the America
Invents Act, the number of defendants sued—even in the lower
period—remains well above the earlier years. Thus, despite some
impact from the America Invents Act, the train still appears to be
barreling down the tracks.13

10
11
12
13

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 49.
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There have been a number of other studies of non-practicing
entities in U.S. litigation. These include studies by: the
Government Accountability Office (“GAO”); Cotropia, Kesan, and
Schwartz; Chien; and by nonprofits and private groups. 14 The
results among these studies are remarkably consistent. What
varies is the way in which the authors slice the data. The GAO
study is a good example. I am intimately familiar with the GAO
data because I was one of three scholars who collected and coded
the data for the GAO. 15 The GAO used a sample of 500 cases
from 2007 to 2011 and looked at the number of lawsuits, not the
number of defendants. Its report shows a smaller increase in the
number of lawsuits filed by non-practicing entities across the
relevant periods than other studies do. Much of the difference
occurs because the GAO looked only at what it defined as
“entities,” which it defined to include only corporations or
partnerships. The GAO did not include anyone organized as a
trust or operating as an individual; adding in trusts and
individuals makes its results similar to everyone else’s.16
By removing individuals and trusts, however, the GAO
figures missed important activity. For example, in the GAO’s own
sample of 500 lawsuits, the party filing the greatest number of
lawsuits turned out to be a trust—one whose business activity is
licensing and litigating patents, and one that is well-known in
the patent arena.17 Thus, the number one non-practicing entity

14 See, e.g., Christopher Anthony Cotropia, Jay P. Kesan & David L. Schwartz,
Unpacking Patent Assertion Entities (PAEs), 99 MINN. L. REV. 649 (2014), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/pape.tar?abstract_id=2346381; Colleen V. Chien, Assistant
Professor, Santa Clara Univ. Sch. of Law, Presentation at 2012 FTC/DOJ Workshop on
PAEs at Santa Clara University: Patent Assertion Entities (Dec. 10, 2012), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2187314; All About NPEs, PAT. FREEDOM, https://www.
patentfreedom.com/about-npes/litigations
(last
updated
July
14,
2014);
PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, 2013 PATENT LITIGATION STUDY: BIG CASES MAKE
HEADLINES, WHILE PATENT CASES PROLIFERATE (2013), available at http://www.pwc.com/
en_US/us/forensic-services/publications/assets/2013-patent-litigation-study.pdf.
15 Sara Jeruss, Robin Feldman & Joshua Walker, The America Invents Act
500: Effects of Patent Monetization Entities on US Litigation, 11 DUKE L. & TECH. REV.
357 (2012) (Lex Machina co-authors Sara Jeruss and Joshua Walker were joined by
Professor Robin Feldman of UC Hastings, College of the Law to code the five hundred
cases in order to establish the types of entities involved in each of the lawsuits and to
examine additional details of the suits. The GAO requested only the coded data without
analysis, and the authors provided this with the understanding that they would publish
their own analysis separate from the GAO report.).
16 See
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-13-465, INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY: ASSESSING FACTORS THAT AFFECT PATENT INFRINGEMENT LITIGATION COULD
HELP IMPROVE PATENT QUALITY 17 n.35 (2013) (noting the exclusion of individuals and
trusts and the resulting variation from the expanded analysis in supra note 6); Feldman,
supra note 3, at 245–50 (describing confusions resulting from the GAO’s definition of
“entity”).
17 Feldman, supra note 3, at 245.
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was left out of the GAO conclusions simply because it was
organized as a trust.
Despite issues such as these, the litigation data itself is
remarkably consistent across researchers. By all accounts,
however, litigation is “only the tip of the iceberg.”18 Most patent
demands never result in a lawsuit, and some estimates suggest
that only ten percent of patent demands proceed all the way to
filing a lawsuit. 19 Patent demands outside of a lawsuit are
potentially the most troubling interactions because they happen
outside the purview of the sovereign, without the disciplining
effects of judges and legal procedures.
Good, objective research into patent demands outside
lawsuits is excruciatingly difficulty to accomplish. These
interactions are shrouded in non-disclosure agreements, ones
that reportedly reach well beyond protecting intellectual property
or confidential business information. I often shake my head at
those who impose aggressive non-disclosure agreements and then
argue vociferously that the government must not act because it
has no data.
There are, however, a limited number of small studies on
patent demands outside lawsuits. These studies frequently use
survey data, including several surveys related to patent demands
and startup companies. 20 For example, in Patent Demands
& Startup Companies: The View from the Venture Capital
Community, 21 I examined responses from roughly 220 venture
capitalists and their portfolio companies. Key results include that
70% of the venture capitalists have portfolio companies that have
received patent demands, with those demands increasing over
the last five years.22 Of those that have received patent demands,
70% have experienced demands in the information technology
sector and 30% have experienced demands in the life sciences.23
Most patent demands against startup companies are coming
from non-practicing entities, and demands are having a
significant financial and human impact on the startups.

Id. at 30.
Id.
See generally, e.g., supra note 3; Colleen V. Chien, Startups and Patent Trolls 1
(Santa Clara Univ. Legal Studies Research Paper No. 09-12, 2012) [hereinafter Startups
and Patent Trolls], available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id
=2146251; Colleen V. Chien, Patent Assertion & Startup Innovation (Sept. 5, 2013)
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract
_id=2321340.
21 See Feldman, supra note 3.
22 Id.
23 Id.
18
19
20
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Other interesting data focus on where the money is going
and where it is coming from. Economic data also is difficult to
come by, but the available information is sobering. In what
economists are calling the “leaky bucket,” very little of the money
paid to non-practicing entities flows back to inventors or
innovation. 24 Only an estimated 20% of the payments to
non-practicing entities gets back to the original inventors or into
any internal research and development.25
In terms of who is paying, the majority of non-practicing
entity lawsuits are filed against small businesses. I am not
talking about the recent rise of patent demands against
mom-and-pop stores. Even before this phenomenon, there has
been data showing that the majority of non-practicing entity
lawsuits are filed against small businesses with revenues under
$10 million.26
Despite these important forays, data on patent demands
outside of litigation remain critically important and difficult to
come by. It is certainly not an easy task to get 220 busy venture
capitalists and startup folks to respond, but it is nothing like
being able to look at public data on 13,000 lawsuits filed.
Managing that difficulty is the challenge ahead for academic
researchers.
Not all of the assertions about non-practicing entities have
held up to scrutiny. This is true regardless of whether those
assertions were advanced in support of patent reform or in
opposition to patent reform. For example, stories have circulated
that non-practicing entities particularly target companies at
funding events, such as when a company receives its first round
of venture capital fundraising. My survey of venture capitalists
and their companies did not find evidence that such a practice is
widespread.27
On the flip side, a narrative had circulated suggesting that
the NPE business model spurs venture capital investment.
According to that theory, venture capitalists will be attracted to
the possibility that a startup company’s patents can be monetized
if the company fails, and this attraction spurs investment.28 The
results of the startup company survey soundly refuted that
24 See James Bessen & Michael Meurer, Essay, The Direct Costs from NPE Disputes,
99 CORNELL L. REV. 387 (2014); Fiona Scott Morton & Carl Shapiro, Strategic Patent
Acquisitions (July 2, 2013) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ss
rn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2288911.
25 Bessen & Meurer supra note 24, at 411.
26 Startups and Patent Trolls, supra note 20, at 1–2.
27 See Feldman, supra note 3.
28 Id. at 240 & n.13 (citing a speech by a federal regulatory official).
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assertion. The majority of venture capitalists who responded do
not consider the potential for selling patents to NPEs when they
decide whether to invest in a company. If it does not matter to
them, it cannot be attracting capital. As one venture capitalist
commented, “VCs swing for the fences; they are not interested in
pennies on the dollar.”29
Moreover, venture capitalists and startups do not see patent
assertion activity in general as good for the startup community.
To paraphrase one venture capitalist, when companies are
spending time and money responding to patent demands, they
are not inventing and they are not hiring.30
Testing various narratives and assertions such as these will
be critical as the policy debates move forward.
II. THE LEGAL SYSTEM RESPONDS
As the non-practicing entity business model has increased so
dramatically in recent years, public attention has increasingly
focused on the phenomenon. The legal system has responded on
many different levels—both federal and state, as well as on the
legislative, regulatory, and common law front. On the legislative
front, the U.S. House of Representatives approved an extensive
patent reform bill in the fall of 2013, aimed largely at litigation
reform.31 The bill died in the Senate Judiciary Committee, after
extensive hearings and debate behind the scenes. Leadership of
both the House and the Senate have indicated that patent reform
will continue to be high on the agenda.
On the regulatory front, the White House released a report
on patent assertion, along with a series of executive orders.32 The
U.S. Patent and Trademark Office instituted its own reforms in
response to the executive orders, and the Federal Trade
Commission initiated a rare section 6(b) investigation into the
economic effects of non-practicing entities, focusing on
twenty-five such entities.33 On the state level, a handful of state
legislatures and attorneys general initiated legislative or

Id. at 280.
Feldman, supra note 3, at 243.
Innovation Act, H.R. 3309, 113th Cong. (2013) (a bipartisan bill aimed at
combating abusive patent litigation).
32 See E XEC . O FFICE OF THE P RESIDENT , P ATENT A SSERTION AND U.S.
INNOVATION (2013), http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/patent_report.pdf.
33 See FTC Seeks to Examine Patent Assertion Entities and Their Impact on
Innovation, Competition, FED. TRADE COMMISSION (Sept. 27, 2013), http://www.ftc.gov/
news-events/press-releases/2013/09/ftc-seeks-examine-patent-assertion-entities-their-imp
act.
29
30
31
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regulatory action against non-practicing entities that allegedly
engage in fraudulent or deceptive practices.34
Perhaps the largest immediate impact may be felt by
Supreme Court decisions during the most recent term. The Court
penned six patent decisions, the largest number in any single
year since the specialized patent appeals court—the Federal
Circuit—was created in 1982. In each opinion, the Justices
soundly rejected the logic of the Federal Circuit. In case after
case, the decisions cut back on the broad roaming range that
patent holders have come to enjoy and expect from the Federal
Circuit.35 The decisions included issues such as: making it easier
to overturn a patent for indefiniteness;36 maintaining the burden
on the patent holder to prove that a patent is valid in a
declaratory judgment action;37 and making it slightly easier for
trial courts to award fees to prevailing parties in “‘exceptional’
cases.”38 Taken together, these decisions will have the effect of
reducing the bargaining power that non-practicing entities have
wielded against companies against whom they are asserting
patents.
The most dramatic Supreme Court decision of last term,
however, is the patentable subject matter decision of Alice v. CLS
Bank. 39 Alice concerned the question of whether and to what
extent software and business method patents may be patentable.
A favorite of non-practicing entities, these broadly worded
patents have proven an effective weapon to wield against product
companies. In rejecting the Federal Circuit’s logic, the Supreme
34 The Vermont state legislature passed a bill, Bad Faith Assertions of Patent
Infringements, H. 299, 2013 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Vt. 2013), codified at VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9,
§§ 4195–4199 (2014). In addition, the Vermont Attorney General filed a complaint against
MPHJ Technology, alleging that MPHJ engaged in unfair and deceptive practices when it
sent letters threatening patent litigation to small businesses and non-profits in the state.
Complaint at 1, State v. MPHJ Tech. Invs., LLC (Vt. Super. Ct. 2014) (No. 282-5-13
Wncv), 2014 WL 2178325. The Oregon Senate passed S. 1540, 77th Leg. Assemb., Reg.
Sess. (Or. 2014) (making patent trolling a violation of the state’s Unlawful Trade
Practices Act). In Wisconsin, the legislature passed S. 498, 2013 Leg., Reg. Sess.
(Wis. 2014) (making it a crime to send patent-licensing demand letters that contain false
or misleading information). In New York, the state Attorney General entered into a
settlement with MPHJ. OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GEN. OF THE STATE OF N.Y., IN THE
MATTER OF THE INVESTIGATION BY ERIC T. SCHNEIDERMAN, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE
STATE OF NEW YORK, OF MPHJ TECHNOLOGY INVESTMENTS, LLC 9 (2014), available at
http://ag.ny.gov/pdfs/FINALAOD MPHJ.pdf (restricting the patent assertion activities
within the state of New York).
35 See Robin Feldman, Coming of Age for the Federal Circuit, 18 GREEN BAG 2D 27
(2014) (describing in detail the Supreme Court’s six patent decisions in the 2013–2014
term).
36 Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2120, 2123 (2014).
37 Medtronic, Inc. v. Mirowski Family Ventures, L.L.C., 134 S. Ct. 843, 845 (2014).
38 See Octane Fitness, L.L.C. v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1749, 1751
(2014); Highmark, Inc. v. Allcare Health Mgmt. Sys., Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1744, 1745 (2014).
39 Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014).
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Court established a test that will be difficult for many of the
existing software and business method patents to meet.40 In fact,
in the first four months after the Supreme Court’s decision, the
lower courts rejected fifteen patents as failing to satisfy
patentable subject matter under the Alice test.41
The impact of the Alice decision will be heightened by new
procedures for post-grant review of patents. As part of the 2011
patent reform legislation, known as The America Invents Act,
parties can now petition the Patent and Trademark Office to
review the validity of patents that have been granted with
procedures that were not previously available. Although complex
and costly, these post-grant review opportunities will allow
companies to challenge software and business method patents
that were granted by the Patent and Trademark Office in the
decades prior to Alice.
In short, the outpouring of information and public attention
has prompted activity at a variety of state and federal levels.
Taken together, these common law, legislative, and regulatory
actions represent a remarkably swift motion in the normally
glacial legal landscape.
III. WHAT LIES AHEAD
As legislative and regulatory activity has increased, the
rhetoric has heated up as well. Commentary has been advanced
with a vehemence normally reserved for debates about topics
such as abortion. It is a sign of the overheated nature of the
commentary when the Supreme Court is attacked as “political”
for its patent decisions and commentators are called “those who
want to destroy the patent system.”42 Although I do not always
agree with decisions rendered by the Supreme Court, for
example, the Court’s patent rulings certainly are not subject to
the lobbying donations that pour in during congressional
deliberations. Nor do they evidence the type of ideological splits
that could conceivably be termed political. In fact, all six of the
Court’s patent decisions this term were unanimous.
Nevertheless, I offer this as a simple example of the overheated
rhetoric and fury that can easily disregard the genuine

See generally id.
Dan Liu & Glaser Weil, A Sea Change After ‘Alice’: Recent Court Decisions Show
Patents Are Vulnerable Under Section 101 Attack, LAW.COM (Oct. 30, 2014),
http://www.law.com/sites/jdsupra/2014/10/30/a-sea-change-after-alice-recent-court-decisio
ns-show-patents-are-vulnerable-under-section-101-attack/?slreturn=20150116141543.
42 Gene Quinn, Silicon Valley’s Anti-patent Propaganda: Success at What Cost?, IP
WATCHDOG (Oct. 12, 2014, 10:00 AM), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2014/10/12/silicon-val
leys-anti-patent-propaganda-success-at-what-cost/id=51643/.
40
41
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challenges faced by the patent system in this period of intense
change.
The challenges are mammoth, indeed. The modern
non-practicing entity business model has rapidly changed the
patent landscape in a remarkably short period of time. As I have
noted in comments to various government bodies, in theory,
monetization could serve positive economic ends by providing
market mechanisms so that those who patent ideas could connect
with those who could translate the ideas into products. The ways
in which patent monetization is playing out at the moment,
however, are troubling. Opportunities for anti-competitive
behavior are rampant and, for the most part, the system seems to
operate primarily as a tax on current production, rather than as
a mechanism for bringing forth new products. It is these
perspectives that seem most troubling.
The changes rendered in recent years—including post-grant
review procedures, tighter requirements for patent validity, and
increased possibility for fee awards in “exceptional cases”—all
have the effect of shifting the bargaining leverage for those who
receive patent demands. The changes do not, however, go to the
heart of the problems that have emerged as the non-practicing
entity business model has accelerated. In addition, the patent
system remains a complex and byzantine affair—one that is
primarily for the well-heeled and not for the faint of heart. Small
players can easily be trampled, and little in either the current
patent system or in the patent reforms will help such a problem.
The pace of change in the patent landscape—not to mention
the impact of those changes—is occurring at an extraordinary
rate. The question is whether we can tone down the rhetoric and
manage to do anything that has a lasting impact on the problems
created. On that question, the jury is still out.
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